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The Antitrust Bulletin/Spring 1984
Pigeonholes in antitrust
BY GEORGE A. HAY*
This conference is intended to celebrate the increased importance
of economics in the decision-making process of the Antitrust
Division and the role played by the Economic Policy Office in
that development. I am delighted to join in that celebration.
However, to inject a note of serenity into the proceedings, it is
useful to be reminded that of the approximately 1,000 antitrust
cases filed each year in federal courts, the Antitrust Division
typically accounts for substantially less than 10% of the total.
While I would not claim that the Department's impact is accu-
rately measured by such a calculation, the statistic reminds us
that there is a rather large chunk of antitrust activity over which
the Department has little direct influence by its selection of which
cases to file.
This is not to say that private cases are immune from the
influence of economists. Judges writing opinions in those cases
are likely to have considerable exposure to economic ideas
through the live testimony of expert witnesses or through the
economics literature cited by counsel for each side. Indeed, on
special occasions, the judge may even have the benefit of an
amicus brief from the Department itself, in which an economi-
cally sensible solution will be urged.
There have been some notable victories in the efforts by
economists to influence the courts, as anyone familiar with the
recent case law on predatory pricing can attest. However, I think
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as an overall matter economists have been much less successful in
this effort than they have been in influencing the case selection
process by the Antitrust Division (and the FTC).
One could argue that the disparity merely reflects the strong
economics orientation of the present heads of the two federal
antitrust agencies. But while there is no doubt that William
Baxter and James Miller may have been more aggressive in
pushing an economically oriented approach than any of their
recent predecessors, the trend dates at least to Donald Turner's
tenure as Assistant Attorney General.
One might also argue that a prosecutor is freer to attempt
innovations (of any kind) than the courts, which may feel more
tightly constrained to follow precedent. But whether or not that is
true, I don't think it is the entire explanation.
My theme this afternoon is that there is another factor at
work that goes a long way to explain the more limited influence
economists have had on the courts. That factor is the courts'
long-standing and deep-seated reluctance to involve themselves in
any kind of in-depth analytical inquiry and their preference for
deciding antitrust cases by reference to a few reasonably simple
rules of thumb, so that the extent of their involvement is to
determine which pigeonhole the challenged activity belongs in.
The per se rule for horizontal and vertical price-fixing is the
most familiar example of the courts' use of rules of thumb,
requiring a court merely to determine whether or not there is an
agreement to fix or stabilize prices. Determination of the legality
of horizontal mergers by adding up market shares is another,
requiring the court merely to determine which of several market
definitions is most appropriate (is it apples or fresh fruit?) and to
compare market shares to an appropriate benchmark.
As any teacher of antitrust law will tell you, the courts'
reluctance to place themselves in the role of economic analyst
dates to the very earliest cartel cases following the passage of the
Sherman Act. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso-
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ciation,' decided in 1897, the Supreme Court was confronted with
defense arguments that the prices agreed to were reasonable, no
more than necessary to prevent cutthroat competition from driv-
ing most of the railroads to bankruptcy. The Court expressed
some skepticism about the entire argument, but a primary factor
in the decision not to address the argument squarely was its
reluctance to adopt a standard that would have required subse-
quent antitrust courts to evaluate whether a rate was reasonable.
The following year, Judge Taft, then an appellate judge,
adopted essentially the same attitude in United States v. Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co.2 when confronted with the argument that the
defendants controlled an insufficient share of the industry to
raise rates above a reasonable level. To attempt to judge the
reasonableness of such a restraint would have been setting sail
''on a sea of doubt."
With minor deviations between 1911 and 1933, the courts
have continued to express their reluctance to undertake any kind
of full-scale inquiry in cases involving an agreement not to
compete, opting for a blanket rule despite recognition that such a
rule may occasionally penalize neutral or procompetitive con-
duct. A footnote in Goldfarb and a sentence or two in Profes-
sional Engineers may have raised expectations that the attitude
was changing, but the recent Maricopa case bears witness to the
view that the aversion to substantive analysis continues.'
So too in the merger area. One year after initially suggesting
in Brown Shoe that a full examination of the market in question,
I United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S.
290 (1897).
2 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 171 U.S. 614 (1899).
3 State of Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 102 S. Ct.
2466 (1982); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association, 421 U.S. 773
(1975); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 98
S. Ct. 1355 (1978).
4 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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including its "structure, history and probable future," would be
necessary to judge the probable anticompetitive effect of a
merger, the Court seemingly adopting the advice of Derek Bok in
a famous law review article,5 indicated that the plaintiff in a
merger case could make out a prima facie case solely by introduc-
ing evidence of a concentrated market and large market shares
for the merging firms. 6
While the treatment of price agreements and mergers provides
the clearest illustration of the courts' preference for simple rules
of thumb, there are numerous other illustrations, some of which I
will mention this afternoon. The significance of this preference is
not that courts are immune from the influence of economists and
incapable of altering long-held positions in favor of more
economically sensible standards. However, the preference for
simple rules and pigeonholes means that the courts will resist
economic advice that can't itself be transformed into a new set of
pigeonholes to replace the old. Reforms that require courts to do
extensive analysis are likely not to be adopted.
Actually, the use of pigeonholes and rules of thumb by courts
should not come as a great surprise to an economist, given how
extensively we use them in our own work, even outside the
antitrust field. Economists routinely ignore the "theory of the
second best" and adopt a rule of thumb that where price moves
closer to marginal cost, welfare is improved. Economists doing
benefit-cost analysis routinely ignore the principle that one can't
make interpersonal utility comparisons and adopt a rule of
thumb that a bridge should be built if the arithmetic sum of
benefits, expressed in terms of willingness to pay, exceeds the sum
of costs. Closer to home, economists evaluating price-discrimina-
tion schemes often adopt a rule of thumb that if the discrimina-
5 Derek C. Bok, "Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of
Law and Economics," Harvard Law Review, Dec. 1960, at 226-355.
6 Some read into the General Dynamics opinion a reversal of the
Court's position on the need for a complete economic inquiry. I do not
share that view. United States v. General Dynamics Corporation, 415
U.S. 486 (1974).
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tion increases output, welfare must be improved, a conclusion
that is not necessarily correct.
Moreover, it is possible to argue that the use of pigeonholes by
courts is economically rational and socially efficient behavior.
The work by Posner and Landes on the economic analysis of civil
procedure reminds us that the overall goal of the legal system,
viewed from an economic perspective, is to minimize the overall
costs of the system, defined as the sum of error costs plus
administrative costs.' A full-scale economic inquiry, if done well,
would be likely to reduce error costs (the costs of discouraging
efficient firm behavior and encouraging anticompetitive behavior
as the result of incorrect decisions), but would be enormously
costly in terms of judicial input and other resources. In addition,
while the lamentations of business about the uncertainty caused
by the unpredictability of antitrust might actually reflect simply a
preference for less antitrust, there appears to be at least some
sentiment for brightline rules even where those rules might in
some cases turn out to prohibit behavior that might ultimately be
deemed innocuous after a more detailed analysis.
But whether or not the use of pigeonholes by courts in
antitrust cases is on balance efficient, it is widespread and, in my
view, unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Economists
seeking to influence the courts are well advised to adapt to this
phenomenon rather than attempt to override it.
Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon at work is
the recent "revolution" in the law on predatory pricing. For
almost the entire history of the Sherman Act, the inquiry in
monopolization cases boiled down to two questions: Does the
defendant possess monopoly power? Did it engage in exclu-
sionary conduct? The process was complicated by the minor
detail that no satisfactory definition of exclusionary conduct had
been adopted, so that enormous effort was invested in providing
enough evidence on behavior and intent that the court could
7 See, e.g., Richard R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed.
1977); some of the joint articles by Landes and Posner are cited therein.
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answer "yes" to the question of whether it had occurred. The
persistent criticism by economists that the ambiguity in the
standard was likely to discourage socially desirable behavior
seemed to have little impact, since no satisfactory alternative set
of pigeonholes gained favor. The main proposals to end the
confusion and lengthy trials involved elimination of the conduct
requirement altogether.
Against this background, the success of the Areeda-Turner
proposals in reorienting the courts in section 2 cases is well
known.8 In my view, what made it possible for the courts to use
the economic advice was that the advice came in the form of
pigeonholes. This is not to say that the evidence needed to
determine the appropriate pigeonhole would necessarily be mini-
mal. However, after listening to the evidence, the court could
choose one of two or three discrete pigeonholes which would
effectively determine the outcome.
Of course, there has been ample academic criticism of the
Areeda-Turner approach and courts have avoided literal adher-
ence to their proposed rules. Therefore, I would not claim that it
is the final resting place. Were I to predict the eventual resolution,
I would guess that a somewhat broader yet still structured inquiry
like that proposed by Joskow and Klevorick9 will win out over a
simple average variable cost test. I am reasonably confident that
the end result will have the kind of pigeonhole characteristics
common to both.
By way of contrast, I will speculate that the 1982 Merger
Guidelines will not have as much influence on the courts as many
(including myself) originally predicted. Not that I am especially
critical of the Guidelines-as a statement of the appropriate
economic methodology for merger analysis, it is a brilliant
8 See George A. Hay, "A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Preda-
tory Pricing Literature," in FTC, Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust
Analysis (Sept. 1981).
9 P. Joskow and A. Klevorick, "A Framework for Analyzing
Predatory Pricing Policy," Yale Law Journal, Dec. 1979, at 213-70.
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document, despite reservations I or others may have on individ-
ual details. Moreover, the guidelines do not have as their stated
purpose the conversion of judicial decision making, but are
offered merely to serve as an explanation of how the Antitrust
Division will analyze mergers so as to assist counsel in determin-
ing which mergers are likely to be challenged and how evidence
might be efficiently organized so as to persuade the Division in
close cases.
Some of the changes contained in the guidelines may influence
the courts. If conversion to the metric system had gone as
smoothly and rapidly as conversion to the use of the Herfindahl
Index, EPA ratings for automobiles would already be expressed
in kilometers per liter. Also, the substantive relaxation of the
critical market share standards and the safe harbor for relatively
unconcentrated industries have all the characteristics that courts
find attractive. Finally, the imprimatur of the Antitrust Division
on the proposition that protection against supercompetitive pric-
ing is the sole focus of antimerger policy may dissuade courts
from using section 7 to advance other policy goals.
However, to an economist, the most important substantive
changes in the guidelines are in the sections on defining the
relevant market and measuring market shares (market definition
from the supply side). Unfortunately, while the proposed 5%
simulation gives the appearance of offering a straightforward rule
of thumb, it has the disadvantage of requiring that specific
numbers be chosen from a continuum of values rather than
offering a series of discrete choices, only one of which may be
selected. Hence, rather than deciding that the market instead of
being limited to the state of Wisconsin should be expanded to
include a three-state area, the court must now decide how much
from the remaining two states will wind up in Wisconsin under
the 5076 experiment.
In at least two circumstances the guidelines can survive this
disadvantage. Where the market shares are so close to the critical
level that any additional product added to the universe will push
them into the protected range, no specific value need be selected.
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At the other extreme, where the elasticity of imports or the
cross-elasticity of supply is extremely high, the court can follow
the Landes-Posner rule and include all capacity for purposes of
measurement. In less polar cases, however, I fear that courts will
find that the guidelines require too much analysis and will
continue to calculate market shares based on actual sales, perhaps
subject to an Elzinga-Hogarty type of test, 0 which does have the
all-or-nothing quality that permits pigeonhole analysis.
The 70-year body of case law on vertical restraints is one of
the best illustrations of the courts' reliance on pigeonholes.
Interestingly, the courts have not been immune to change. How-
ever, the process by which we have reached the present state of
the law more closely resembles a comedy of errors than a
Kuhn-like scientific revolution, as each of a series of tests has
collapsed of its own weight.
From the first cases three themes, seemingly translatable into
discrete pigeonholes, governed the status of vertical restraints
imposed by a manufacturer. The first theme-that of restraint on
alienation-was used to rule against any restraint the manufac-
turer tried to impose on a purchaser of its product. The second
theme-that a manufacturer could choose with whom he would
deal (the so-called Colgate doctrine)-limited the restraint on
alienation doctrine to situations where an agreement (however
defined) could be demonstrated. The third theme-that a manu-
facturer could direct its own employees-was used to insulate a
vertically integrated firm from antitrust scrutiny in this area,
leading to the curious result that an integrated manufacturer
could fix retail prices while the identical restraint would be
unlawful if imposed by a nonintegrated firm.
Unfortunately, consignment arrangements, which operated as
a hybrid of vertical integration and restraint on alienation, posed
serious problems for those pigeonholes, since it became clear that
10 Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty, "The Problem of
Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits," 18 Antitrust
Bulletin 45-81 (1973).
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a nonintegrated manufacturer could escape the doctrine of re-
straint on alienation by setting up a quasi-employment contract
with its distributors. Failure to do so converted the identical
restraint from immune to per se unlawful. In addition, extensive
litigation over the question of whether the Colgate principle was
satisfied has made it clear that once the concept of agreement is
extended beyond formal contractual arrangements, there is no
principled basis for establishing whether the restraint is unilater-
ally imposed. Faced with the awkwardness in such critical yet
meaningless distinctions, and armed with a persistent stream of
literature suggesting that vertical restraints could be economically
efficient, the Court in GTE Sylvania" tried to reduce the size of
the problem by imposing a new set of pigeonholes on top of the
old, such that vertical price restraints would continue to be per se
unlawful (with the consignment and Colgate issues left not fully
resolved), but non-price restraints would be judged under a rule
of reason.
While economists view the Sylvania decision as an improve-
ment, there are enough problems with the revised standards that
the Court has already been forced to reconsider its position.
First, economists cited with approval in the Sylvania opinion
continue to insist that the price/non-price distinction makes no
theoretical sense. Moreover, independent of whether the distinc-
tion between price and non-price restraints is justified as a matter
of theory, courts have realized to their discomfort that there are
serious practical problems in deciding which way a restraint
should be labeled, since even the typical non-price restraint is
designed to insulate the dealers from intrabrand price competi-
tion to a certain extent, and is likely therefore to affect prices.
Second, assuming that the restraint is labeled as non-price, courts
are given little guidance as to what is meant by the rule of reason
in this context and how it is to be applied. Finally, the Colgate
and consignment issues remain unresolved.
11 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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The need for further revision of the standards creates an
opportunity for economists to exert an influence. 2 It is interesting
to speculate how one might structure economic advice to the
courts so as to provide a new but better set of pigeonholes. It is
clear that some economists would prefer a very simple rule.
Manufacturer-imposed restraints would be per se lawful, be they
price or non-price restraints. Only restraints which were reluc-
tantly imposed by the manufacturer acting as the "cat's-paw" of
the dealers would be unlawful. The sole exception would be
where manufacturer-imposed restraints facilitated a manufac-
turers' cartel.
I have difficulty understanding how courts would make the
"cat's-paw" distinction, unless the manufacturer testified cre-
dibly that he would be delighted to see the restraint invalidated.
As a general matter, the restraint would benefit both the manu-
facturer and its dealer, and it would seem pointless to try to
apportion the benefits to see who got the larger share. I am
inclined to think that the distinction was never intended to be
taken seriously, so that as a practical matter, all restraints would
be treated as manufacturer imposed. On the horizontal cartel
exception, while I am fascinated by the prospect that a facilitat-
ing practices approach could be used to invalidate parallel vertical
restraints by several manufacturers, experience with the facilitat-
ing practices approach leads me to doubt that it would have many
practical applications in the vertical context."
Putting aside these practical reservations, the overall strategy
would have the advantage of eliminating the need for economi-
cally meaningless yet historically important distinctions. The
Colgate doctrine could be retired and consignment arrangements
would raise no special issues. Finally, there would be no need for
12 The Antitrust Division participated as amicus curiae in the recent
Monsanto case (yet to be decided) and is apparently in the process of
drafting guidelines on vertical restraints. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-rite
Service Corp., 46 A.TT.R. 603 (1984).
13 George A. Hay, "Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly and Antitrust
Law," 67 Cornell Law Review 439-81 (Mar. 1982).
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the Court to give further instruction on what was meant by a rule
of reason analysis in the vertical context, since none would be
needed.
If the courts are unwilling to adopt the strategy in its entirety,
they will face some serious difficulties in deriving new standards
that will limit the judge to application of simple rules. If a
distinction is to be maintained between price and non-price
restraints, the only plausible rule I can envisage is that a manu-
facturer could not require a dealer to charge certain prices nor
dismiss a dealer solely because of his failure to adhere to sug-
gested prices. While the dealer who was free-riding on the efforts
of other dealers would often have lower costs and lower prices as
a result, the manufacturer would be obliged to focus on whether
the dealer was living up to his service and other dealership
obligations and could not use failure of the dealer to charge the
suggested price as the basis of an inference that the dealer failed
to honor those obligations.
With regard to the Colgate doctrine, to the extent that price or
non-price restraints will be found unlawful in some circum-
stances, it is difficult to see how the exception can be maintained
for manufacturers' suggested retail terms followed by termina-
tion of noncomplying dealers. While I may not agree with the
FTC decision in Russell Stover," I concur with Commissioner
Pertschuk's view that the Colgate distinction is unworkable.
Finally, with respect to a rule of reason analysis of vertical
restraints, I continue to be mystified as to what the court is
supposed to look for. If the standard economic theory of vertical
restraints is accepted at face value, they are designed to permit a
manufacturer to market its product more effectively. If so,
consumer welfare should be improved regardless of whether the
manufacturer is a monopolist or a small fry. I will venture to
guess, however, that the courts will be sufficiently nervous about
unleashing monopolists to do something that may turn out, in
14 The Commission's decision was subsequently reversed. Russell
Stover Candies, Inc. v. FT.C., No. 82-2036, CA8 (Sept. 29, 1983).
HeinOnline -- 29 Antitrust Bull. 143 1984
144 : The antitrust bulletin
some yet to be developed model, to be demonstratedly anticom-
petitive, that they will adopt a test that makes the legitimacy of
vertical restraints depend primarily on the manufacturer's market
share, with a share of 20% or more generating at least a greater
burden on the manufacturer to show the need for the restraint,
perhaps by demonstrating the seriousness of the free-rider prob-
lem.
While economists have frequently criticized individual tie-in
cases, they have been unsuccessful in offering a workable stan-
dard that is superior to that currently in use. The dilemma arises
because, where a tie-in is used to effect a price-discrimination
scheme, the welfare results are ambiguous.
Moreover, a rule that makes legality depend on whether
output is increased, while it may approximate the standard that is
theoretically correct, is not likely to be useful as a rule of thumb.
Since the profitability of discrimination to the discriminator is
not at all dependent on whether output increases, there is likely to
be little corporate documentation about the firm's perception of
what will happen to output. Legality, then, would depend on a
variable that the firm has no business interest in knowing and
perhaps no special expertise in predicting-rather an unhappy
state of affairs for those attempting to avoid antitrust problems.
Moreover, it is not that much easier for the judge to determine,
after the fact, whether output was larger than it would have been
without the tie.
Interestingly, a rule that would essentially immunize vertical
restraints for firms with small market shares and create a rebut-
table presumption of illegality for larger firms bears some re-
semblance to the current rules governing tying arrangements.
Fortner held that such arrangements are unlawful if imposed by a
firm with market power, defined as the power to charge a
noncompetitive price or exact other terms and conditions that
could not be exacted in a competitive market."
15 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 395 U.S. 495
(1969).
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Unfortunately, while the language might be interpreted to
require a monopoly share of the market in a section 2 sense, it
seems to have been interpreted so as to reach firms with some
degree of product differentiation even where overall market
shares are quite low and where barriers to entry are such that no
long-term monopoly power is likely to exist. If that aspect of the
rule were modified so as to require genuine monopoly power, the
change would probably result in a net economic gain, but the rule
would still not very closely approximate the theoretically correct
standard.
There are numerous other illustrations of situations where the
court's need for simple rules frustrates the economist's interest in
a perfect outcome. However, the purpose of my paper is not to
exhaust the possibilities but to stimulate discussion. To that end,
let me close by restating my theme. Economists in the Antitrust
Division operate in a luxurious intellectual environment. They are
free to call things as they see them on individual cases with no
particular need to distinguish past cases or to lay down general
(yet simple) rules to govern future cases. Within that environ-
ment, they have scored impressive successes and are to be con-
gratulated for them.
Outside the prosecutor's office, however, the game is played
somewhat differently. Courts will neither take on the role of
economic analyst themselves nor rely completely on the expert
who simply asserts that, in his expert judgment, the behavior is or
is not anticompetitive. Courts are prepared to adapt their stan-
dards to conform to economists' ideas about efficiency, but only
where those ideas can be used to generate a limited set of
pigeonholes or some simple rules. There may be circumstances
where this is impossible without doing great violence to the
underlying economic principles. But the stakes are sufficiently
high that it would be wrong to admit defeat until greater effort is
made.
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